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The availability of quantity information along with expenditure information in some
household surveys allows the estimation of price reactions on the basis of unit values. We
compare two specifications that have been proposed in this context by Deaton (1990) and
Crawford et al. (1997) in order to take account of quality effects reflected in the unit values.
Using simulated data for a two-good model, and keeping Marshallian elasticities fixed, we
compare true and pseudo-true quantity and quality elasticities. Expenditure elasticities are
close, but we find large differences in price elasticities and even sign reversals. This suggests
that, while convenient in the situation where prices are not observable, these specifications
lack flexibility.
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In empirical demand analysis based on household data it is usually difficult to estimate price
reactions, because of insufficient information on price variation. However, many budget sur-
veys present information on both expenditures and quantities purchased, which allows the
computation of household-specific unit values, as ratios of expenditure over quantity. Since
variation in these unit values can result from both variation in prices and household choices
regarding the quality of the good purchased, the estimation of price reactions on the basis of
such data requires the specification of a system of budget share and unit value equations for
each good. We compare two such specifications currently used in the empirical literature, on
the basis of simulated data. Contrary to the real world situation where unit data are used, we
assume that prices are observed. Generating data for two goods from one model we compare
the corresponding elasticities with those obtained from the estimation of the other model. We
repeat the experiment the other way round and also introduce a more general model in order
to generate data and estimate the two models under comparison. In spite of its simplicity,
the experiment yields clear-cut answers: although expenditure elasticities are similar between
models, we find large differences in price elasticities, and even sign reversals. This suggests
that the tractability of the models studied — essential when prices are not observed — is paid
by excessive inflexibility.1. Introduction
The availability of quantity information along with expenditure information in
some household surveys allows the estimation of price reactions on the basis
of unit values, defined as the ratio of expenditure and quantity for each good.
Deaton (1987, 1988, 1990) has proposed a strategy for estimating price reac-
tions jointly with choice of unit values in data of this type. This entails the
specification of a system of budget share and unit value equations, with the log-
arithms of total expenditure and (unobserved) prices as explanatory variables,
and Deaton's specification (henceforth model (D)) is basically a first order Taylor
approximation. Crawford et al. (1997) have developed an alternative approach
which exploits the implicit links between quantity and unit value choices, re-
sulting in a model which, in contrast to model (D), is consistent with demand
theory (model (C)). Both specifications are currently used in empirical work, see
for instance Ayadi et al. (1997) for model (D) and De Vreyer (1996) for model
(C).
The purpose of this paper is to compare these two specifications: it may well
be the case that the theory-consistent model (C) for the unit value equation is
so badly misspecified that a first order Taylor expansion like (D) outperforms it
in spite of its lack of internal consistency. We proceed as follows: choosing one
of the models as the true model for a system with two goods, and a set of true
values for its parameters, we compute the pseudo-true values of the parameters
of the alternative model — i.e. the values minimising the Kullback contrast
between the true joint distribution of the budget shares and unit values, and
the distribution entailed by the alternative model. Keeping overall Marshallian
elasticities fixed, we compare the way in which true and pseudo-true quantity
and quality elasticities evolve as functions of the budget share W\ of one of the
two goods. We repeat the procedure by reverting the roles (true and pseudo-
true) of the two specifications. We also introduce a non-linear generalisation for
the specification of Crawford et al. (model (G)), and perform a third comparison
between models (C) and (D), taking the true distribution of the data to belong
to model (G).While many more comparisons could be undertaken, this already provides
clear-cut answers: expenditure elasticities remain close, but we find large dif-
ferences in price elasticities, and even some sign reversals. This suggests that
the tractability of these functional forms in the situation where prices are not
observed is paid by excessive inflexibility.
Section 2 presents the three models (D), (C) and (G) and discusses the implied
profiles of the various elasticities as functions of the budget share of one of the
goods. Section 3 discusses the computation of pseudo-true values and Section 4
comments the graphs summarising the results.
2. Two Specifications and an Extension
We start with a brief exposition of Deaton's approach to modelling the deter-
mination of unit values. Goods are taken to be organised into m groups such
as food, clothes, etc. Consumption within a group g is a vector of quantities
qg. A group quantity index Qg is defined as Qg = kg.qg,where kg is a vector
of aggregating units typically chosen by the data collector. Group spending is
xg = pg.qg, where pg is the vector of group prices. We assume that relative prices
within each group are fixed, so that pg = ?r5p^, where 7rff is defined as a scalar
(Paasche) linear homogeneous price level for the group (for instance, the price
for the aggregate "meat"), and p®g is a vector representing the fixed within-group
relative price structure (for instance, the relative prices of different types and
qualities of meat).
For each household we can define a unit value for each group of goods, Vg =
xg/Qg. Given the definitions above, this leads naturally to the definition of a
"quality" index £g: since
x^ = 7TgP°g.qg ^
Qg kg.qg
we have Vg = 7rg£g, with
Z9 = pl-qglQg- (2-2)
Note that a specification in terms of the logarithm of unit values translates
4immediately into a specification in terms of the logarithms of the quality indices.
Model (D): Given the assumptions made by Deaton, the variables Qg, xg,
£g, Vg, as well as related variables such as budget shares, wg = xg/X, will all
be functions of X, the total expenditure, and TT, the vector of (unobserved)
group prices. Thus, Deaton (1990) specifies a fairly general first-order Taylor
approximation in the form
wg = ag + J2 6gh In 7rh + Pg In X, h (2.3)
In £g = ag + Yl dgh In -Kh + bg In X. h
Crawford et al. (1997) show that, given Deaton's assumptions, there exist in
fact cross-equation restrictions between the budget share and the unit value
equations, stemming from the functional restrictions
Qg = HgiZgQg) /9 4\
^ = hg{tgQg) .
 [ZA)
Model (C): Crawford et al. propose to specify the budget share relation-
ship, wg(X, 7r), and to derive a relationship between £g and Qg from an inde-
pendent specification of (2.4), since the form of hg is unrestricted. In particular,
with a budget share equation as in (2.3) the specification of
hg (Z9Qg) = (tgQ9)
Bs/{l+Ba) exp [Ag/ (1 + Bg))
leads to the simple form
(2.5)
Model (G): A common feature of models (D) and (C) is their linearity,
which is central to the estimation strategies followed by Deaton (1990) and Craw-
ford et al. (1997): the price vector re is not observed, and linearity allows the use
of fixed effect techniques to sweep it away, given regional information and the
assumption that IT varies only between, but not within, regions. However, in this
paper we do not focus on that estimation strategy, but rather on the properties
of the two specifications above, and it is of interest to confront them with a more
general specification, which does not need to satisfy linearity. A simple extensionof model (C) satisfying the cross-equation restrictions (2.4) is:
In £ff = Ag + Bg In (£gQg) + Cg [in (£gQg) ]
2 . (2.6)
Note how we differentiate the notations for the parameters, so that their origin
remains clear throughout: Greek letters refer to the parameters of the share
equations, lower case (upper case [with tilde]) Latin letters to the parameters of
the quality equation from model (D) (model (C) [model (G)]).
Elasticities: Since wg = -Kg^gQg, the usual Marshallian elasticities derived
from the share equation in (2.3) will be the sum of the elasticities of quantity
and quality with respect to expenditure and prices, respectively. Thus, given
the homogeneity relationship between expenditure and price elasticities, eg =
egg + egh = 0, all relevant information is contained in the form of the Marshallian
price elasticities and the relationship between the elasticity of quantity w.r.t.
each price and the corresponding Marshallian elasticity. This information is
summarised in Table 1, where the notation Xg used for model (G) is defined as
\g = l-Bg-2Cgln(ZgQg):
Table 1: Marshallian elasticities and elasticities of quantity w.r.t. price
Marshallian model (D) model (C) model (G)
A few comments are in order. The homogeneity property is satisfied not only
by the Marshallian elasticities, but also by the quality and quantity elasticities.
Quality elasticities are constant in model (D). Quantity elasticities in model (D)
and all elasticities in model (C) depend only on model parameters and on wg
(linearly in it;"
1).-By contrast, elasticities for model (G) also depend on the
product t,gQg and are thus related in a more complicated way to wg.
Of course there are also linear relationships between elasticities for models (D)









Thus the difference e% — e^ increases or decreases with wg according to the sign
of (5gBgl (1 + Bg) while its magnitude also depends on bg. This makes it clear
that a meaningful investigation of the plausible magnitude of these differences
requires the establishment of a relationship between the parameters above. This
is the subject of the next section.
3. Computation of Pseudo-true Values
In the sequel we consider only two goods. Thus u>2 = 1 — w\. We will as-
sume that the distribution of w\ given the vector Z of explanatory variables
(In nit In 7T2, In X) is known. Denoting Y the vector of remaining endogenous vari-
ables (ln£l5 ln£2), and considering a parametric model for the conditional distri-
bution of Y given Z, with densities {/ (Y\Z,9) ,0 G O}, the pseudo-true value
9* of 9 is defined as
9* = arg max EZEO In / {Y\Z, 9)
where £o denotes the expectation w.r.t. the true conditional distribution of
Y given Z, and ^denotes the expectation w.r.t. the marginal distribution
of Z (see e.g. Gourieroux and Monfort, 1989).
Following Deaton (1990) we assume that the marginal distribution of Z is
normal with expectation (4.6, 0, 0) and a diagonal variance matrix with diagonal
(0.5, 0.1, 0.1). We also specify the conditional distribution of w\ given Zas
normal with variance 0.0005 and expectation
E {wi\Z) = ai + <5n Inm + 6UInTT2 + (3X InX,
with the numerical values a\ = 0, 8\\ = 0.046, 8\2 — —0.066, (31 = 0.02. These
choices again follow Deaton's, with the exception that we choose the value of 8\2so as to ensure zero degree homogeneity of the budget share.
1 With these choices
we obtain the following ranges for the overall Marshallian elasticities:






0.05 1.40 0.98 -0.08 -1.32 -0.05 -0.92
0.85 1.02 0.87 -0.95 -0.08 -0.31 -0.56
We will describe case by case the assumptions concerning the distribution of
(In £>1, In £2)5 but before that we outline the general procedure followed for the
computation of pseudo-true values. The true model allows us to simulate any
amount of data, and the use of a pseudo-ML estimator yields as precise an
estimation as desired for the pseudo-true value. In order to economise on the
number of simulations needed to achieve a given precision, we make use of the
technique of antithetic variables (see e.g. Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, 744-
747).
In the sequel we will call "situation (X)" the situation where the true model
is (X).
Situation (D): We specify the conditional distribution of (In £:, In £2) given
Z as normal with a diagonal variance matrix with diagonal (0.1, 0.1) and expec-
tation
Ei^n^Z) = ai + (in lnTTi + di2ln7T2 + 61
E (In£2\Z) — 0,2 + c?2i In -K\ + G^2 In n2 + 62 In X,
with numerical values a\ = 02 = 0, b\ = 0.5, 62 = 0.2, d\\ — 0^22 — 0.3,
d\2 — —0.8, c/21 = —0.5. In choosing these values we have taken account of the
zero degree homogeneity of £p, which results from the homogeneity of both pg
and Qg.
The specification retained for the pseudo-model (C) is:
ln^ = Ag + Bg\nQg + tg, g = 1,2, (3.1)
1 Expressing the Slutsky matrix in terms of Marshallian elasticities we are able to check
concavity of the corresponding cost function for each value of u>\\ we find that, for the chosen
values of the parameters, concavity is satisfied for wi < 0.9. In interpreting the results we will
thus focus on this range for w\.where (£1, £2) is assumed bivariate normal with unrestricted covariance structure
and zero expectation given Z. For a precision of 10~
6 the number of simulations
required was 1065. Technical details on the computation of the pseudo-true
values, as well as a table recapitulating true and pseudo-true values, are given in
the Appendix.
Situation (C): We generate data using (3.1) assuming (£1,^2)' bivariate
normal with zero expectation and diagonal variance matrix with diagonal (0.1,
0.1). The numerical values are Ax = 2, A2 = 4, Bx = 0.45, B2 = 0.22.
The data are simulated using the linear system
In £p + In Qg = In wg - In -ng + In X, . .
ln£5 - Bg\nQg = Ag + tg
 [ '
 j
where the first equation results from the identity wg — £g7cgQg/X. The pseudo-
model (D) is identical to the true model (D) above, except as regards the co-
variance structure, which is unrestricted. The number of simulations needed was
1649 (4149 without antithetic variables).
Situation (G): The data is generated using
ln^ = Ag + Bg\n (£gQg) + Cg [in (£gQg)}
2+ tg, g = 1,2, (3.3)
and the same assumptions on the distribution of (t\, £2)' as above. The numerical
values chosen are A\ = 0, A2 = 0, £1 = 0.5, B2 = 0.5, C\ = -0.004, C2 =
-0.004.
The data are simulated using the formulas
ln£y = .% + Bg {InWg-\mTg + \nX) + Cg{\nwg-\mrg +InX)
2 + tg,
\nQg = -Ag + (l - Bg) (\nwg -In-Kg + lnX) - Cg{\nwg -\nirg + \nX)
2 -t
obtained after simple algebraic transformations. The pseudo-models (D) and (C)
are chosen as above. The numbers of simulations required were 2478 for model
(D) and 707 for model (C).
4. Results
For each of the three situations above, we have produced a graph for each good
and each type of elasticity (expenditure, own price, price of the other good)while grouping quantity and quality elasticities. This yields a total of 18 graphs of
which we reproduce only two here.
2 We show results for w\ between 0.05 and 0.85.
As noted below Table 1, the elasticities for model (G) do not depend solely on
parameters and W\ but also on In {igQg), or equivalently on In wg — \mrg + In X.
Setting 7Ti = 7T2 = 1 this becomes In wg + ln X and the expectation of the budget
share for good 1 is w\ — (3-^ \nX, which yields a value of lnX corresponding to
each value of w\.
The main findings are the following. The expenditure elasticities for models
(D) and (C) are close for both goods in all situations — the largest discrepancy,
about 0.23, occurs for good 2 in situation (G) — with quantity elasticities be-
tween a half and two thirds of Marshallian elasticities. Quality elasticities for
model (C) are almost constant for good 1 for w\ > 0.3. For model (G), Figure
1 shows a profile of e\, the quantity expenditure elasticity for good 1, which is
first decreasing then increasing as a function of wi, a profile which is a priori
excluded for the other two specifications. Also noteworthy on Figure 1 is the fact
that all elasticities for models (D) and (C) remain grouped, around a value of
0.55, whereas the relative importance of quantity and quality elasticities varies
substantially for model (G), between 0.7 and 0.85 for the quantity elasticity and
between 0.6 and 0.2 for the quality elasticity.
Own price elasticities show more important discrepancies, attaining 0.7 in
absolute terms for the quantity elasticity of good 1 in situation (D). In that
situation, the quality elasticities for both goods are of opposite signs for models
(D) and (C), positive for the former, negative for the latter.
The discrepancies are also large for cross price elasticities, with a maximum
of 0.7 for the quantity elasticity ei2 in situation (D). As Figure 2 shows, sign
reversals occur for the cross price elasticities of quantity: only ef^ takes positive
values, possibly a result of the constancy restriction for the quality elasticity in
model (D). This also happens in situations (C) and (D). In situation (D) e£ and
ejFi have opposite signs for all values of ui\ (positive for the former, negative for
the latter).
2 The complete series of graphs will be provided upon request.
105. Conclusion
This very limited experiment leads to surprisingly clear-cut conclusions on two
specifications used for the estimation of demand systems on the basis of unit
values: these two models can yield strikingly different results as concerns the
decomposition of price elasticities in quantity and quality elasticities. Whether
the fact that we have restricted overall Marshallian elasticities to coincide does
trigger these discrepancies or in the contrary helps the models track each other
is not entirely clear to us, but our conjecture is rather in favour of the latter
assumption.
The conclusion we draw from the exercise is that, while these two specifications
are attractive for the estimation of price reactions when only unit values and
regional information are available — and prices themselves remain unobserved,
the search for more flexible but tractable specifications of the unit value equations
should be rewarding.
6. Appendix: Technical details on the
computation of the pseudo-true values
For ease of presentation we start with the case where model (C) is the true model.
Situation (C): Given a data set of size iV we compute the ML estimate 9N
of the parameters of model (D). For N —> oo this will converge to the pseudo
true value 9*. The system to be estimated is a system of seemingly unrelated
regressions with identical regressors, and given the normality assumption, the
ML estimator coincides with OLS equation by equation (see e.g. Oberhofer and
Kmenta, 1974). Furthermore, the computation of the elasticities only requires
knowledge of the slope parameters bg, dgg, dgh for g, h = 1, 2. The only piece of
information we still need to acquire to compute these is the covariance matrix
cov (In £, Z), which we approximate by simulation of the corresponding empirical
moments.
Situation (D): Here we have the problem that tg correlates with \nQg:
11indeed since Qg = Xwg/ (ftgZg) we have
E(tg\nQg) = g(gg)
E{tg]nwg)-E(tg]nQ,
and there is no reason why this should be zero. A possibility to approximate the
pseudo-true value of the slopes Bg is to compute the limit of the single equation
instrumental variable estimator obtained with lnX as instrument. This is the
product of cov (\nX,\nQgy and cov (ln^,lnQ?) , which we approximate as
above by simulation of the corresponding empirical moments.
Situation (G): The only change concerns the data generation, and the
computation of pseudo-true values for models (D) and (C) proceeds as above.
Table A.I gives an overview of true and pseudo-true values in all situations. Note
that the pseudo-true values for model (D) in situations (C) and (G) do satisfy
the homogeneity constraints (bg + dgg + dgh = 0, g, h — 1, 2), as expected.






































N.B. The values for the intercepts Ag and Ag, g — 1,2, are not shown, because








Figure 1: Expenditure elasticities, good 1, situation (G)
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Figure 2: Cross elasticities, good 1, situation (G)
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